Guardian 14 Aug 2014
Three years ago, when the world obsessed about President Assad, some of us warned that Syria was only one front-line in a wider sectarian war between Sunni and Shia; that the spread of militant jihadism among the Sunni community, funded by Saudi Arabia and Qatr, was a preparation for this. And that, before long this movement, like the 30 years religious war of eighteenth century Europe, would threaten to engulf the entire Muslim world.
This is the true context in which the ISIS terror in the Middle East must be seen. It is why we need to understand that though the world watches Iraq today, just as it did Syria yesterday, the actual war being fought is a regional one, with potential to spread across Islam world-wide. It is not an accident that many ISIS fighters are foreigners – many of them not even Arabs. Or that they use the most modern 21st century global communications to evangelise their medieval horrors.
Of course, seeing the tragedy on Mount Sinjar, something must be done. But then we said the same about the slaughter in the now forgotten suburbs of Damascus. What we need now is not just a plan for a tragedy, but a strategy for a widening war.
What is happening in the Middle East, like it or not, is the wholesale re-writing of the Sykes-Picot borders of Versailles 1918, in favour of an Arab world whose shapes will be arbitrated more by religious dividing lines, than the old imperial conveniences of a hundred years ago.
For as long as Western policy makers deny, even tacitly, that this is the most likely outcome of present events, so long will they fail to find solutions to the Middle Eastern conundrums that confront us.
And so we come to the case of the beleaguered Kurds and their desperate neighbours, the Yazidis trapped in terror and desolation on Sinjar.
And so, we drop humanitarian aid. But then what? We did the same in Srebrenica. It worked well enough for a few days. But in the absence of a credible Western policy in Bosnia, it only space for mass murder later.
So what credible policies are available to us in Iraq?
There are three.
The first is an all out, long-term Western military engagement to defeat ISIS and save Baghdad. This is favoured by some who have not yet learnt the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, and a few superannuated Generals seeking more spending on defence. It is, by far the least practical and most unwise option open to us. Western populations would not support it and we no longer have the military means to do it.
The second is to help the Iraqi state to defeat ISIS themselves. This, it seems is current Western policy. But I fear it amounts to little more than elevating a desperate hope, over any reasonable expectation. It was the collapse of the Iraqi army which gave ISIS the advanced American weapons they now use to drive back the Kurds. And it has been the subsequent absence of any effective Government in Baghdad, which has allowed the jihadists to continue widening their advance on all fronts. The Potemkin reconstruction of the Iraqi Government in the last few days is unlikely to alter a fundamental truth; the Iraqi state is not, and is unlikely to become, an effective instrument for a Western backed attempt to tackle the ISIS insurrection. Unless of course Iran, too gets directly involved. But that would lead inevitably to the creation of a de facto greater Iran extending into Iraq and to a further widening of the sectarian fault-lines. This may not be avoidable – but should we be encouraging it?
The third option is to help the Kurds by all means possible – assistance to house the Yazidis, equipment, military training, advice, protective air-strikes – anything short of current operational boots on the ground. The aim would be to make Iraqi Kurdistan the northern bulwark against the ISIS advance. The Government seems at last to be tiptoeing in this direction – but why so half-hearted? It’s a strange scruple that flies in other people’s weapons, but denies access to our own? Is there a difference?
But there are downsides here, too – big ones. Whether intentional or not, we will end up acting as hand-maiden to Kurdish ambitions for full independence – and in so doing, effectively assisting in the dismemberment of Iraqi. Part of the deal with the Kurds would have to be an end to interference in Turkey, who have their own problems with Kurdish secessionism. We would also be tacitly accepting the end of the Sykes – Picot borders in the Middle East.
So this will only work if it is, not just a short term plan, but part of an integrated long term strategy. A new rapprochement with Iran to act as a counter balance to those who promote Sunni jihadism. Deeper engagement with Turkey. Greater pressure on those Gulf states who fund jihad – (is the Government’s reluctance here, because of Tory friends amongst the Gulf states?). And a new determination to deal with illegal Israeli settlements, as a prelude to a lasting peace in Palestine.
None of this will be easy, of course. But better surely, to face up to the realities of the post-Sykes-Picot Middle East and influence it where we can, than lose the moment standing impotently by hoping that yesterday will come back again.
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