Category: Foreign Affairs

The revelation of 9/11 still applies. Our peace too will depend on the extent that we are willing and able to work together to prevent conflict or re-construct peace in other parts of the world.

 

We live in turbulent and instable times and, as the world moves deeper and deeper into the era of resource scarcity and massive shifts in the tectonic plates of power, this mix is only likely to get more potent and more dangerous.

 

At the present there are some 74 conflicts in progress around the world, the overwhelming majority of which have occurred inside states or between ethnicities.[1] Some believe that what this tells us is that era inter state war is over – that these “little” brush fire, intra state wars of recent years, are the only wars there will be in the future – and that the age of great wars is passed.

 

I am not one of those – partly because there is so much dry tinder lying around and far too many firebrands; partly because interstate competition, especially in the developing world is not diminishing, it is increasing. And partly because the best structures for fighting wars, the most powerful ideologies for driving wars and the most destructive weapons for using in wars, still remain in the hands of nation states.

 

But all major conflicts are preceded by a period of instability. Indeed one way to look at the world’s present “little” wars is that they are the “pre-shocks” which always accompany major shifts in the established order. If we can control these better, by preventing them where we can, intervening more wisely where we have to and then reconstructing peace more successfully afterwards, we may make it easier to avoid a wider conflict.

 

We have shown that we are anything but good at this. We seem condemned to making and re-making, even the mistakes we know are mistakes, over and over again. The Iraq experience – and Afghanistan too – represent the triumph of hubris and amnesia over common sense. And in consequence, in both of those countries, we are now in grave danger of snatching a peace making defeat from of the jaws of a military victory.

 

But there is a deeper reason for our failures. The “gun boat” diplomacy approach to peace making isn’t working. If this were to lead to the end of intervention in the future it would be a tragedy, because we are going to need more of this, not less in an increasingly globalised and interdependent world. The fact that we have got it wrong so often should not blind us to the fact that there is a way of doing it right.

 

The things that have to be done to increase the chances of success – and things that should not be done because they can lead to failure – are not exactly rocket science and they are definitely not new – if only we could remember them long enough to apply them.

 

Avoid the conflict if you can – it will be much cheaper that way. But if conflict cannot be avoided, remember that it is not over when the fighting is finished. So, spend at least as much time and effort planning peace as you do in preparing for war; make sure your plan is based on a proper knowledge of the country and leave your ideologies and prejudices at home. It is a mistake to try to fashion someone else’s country in your own image; leave space for them to reconstruct the country they want, not the one you want for them. Remember that you don’t get a second chance to make a first impression; so don’t lose the “golden hour” after the fighting is over – remember that an army of liberation has a very short half life before it risks becoming an army of occupation. Dominate the security space from the start; then concentrate first on the rule of law; make economic regeneration an early priority; remember the importance of articulating an “end state” which can win and maintain local support; but leave elections as late as you decently can. be sensitive to local traditions and customs. Understand the importance to the international community effort of co-ordination, cohesion and speaking with a single voice. And then at the end, do not wait until everything is as it would be in your country, but leave when the peace is sustainable.

 

And remember, foresight, which is the mother of prevention. There is no reason why the need to intervene should always take us by surprise. If the international community had put as much effort into prevention as we have into military intervention, some recent conflicts could have been avoided altogether.

 

Cohesion is the key. Multilateralism is better than unilateralism. Success can only come from a joined up approach which views the continuum of peace making as a “seamless garment” stretching from prevention, right through to the final exit of the interveners when a sustainable peace has been reconstructed.

 

To be successful needs more than good intentions and a warm desire to do something to help. Intervention is a very blunt instrument, whose outcomes are not always predictable.

 

So it is not for the faint hearted – or the easily bored. It needs steely toughness and strategic patience in equal measure. And a willingness to commit a lot of troops at the start, a capacity to provide sustained international support to the end and an ability to endure a time frame that is measured in decades, not years.

 

And the only reward, is that all that expenditure will be less than the cost of the war that was avoided, or the price of chaos which would have ensued if the international community had stayed at home.

 

What that means is that intervention should not be undertaken lightly or because no-one can think of anything better. Intervening has a tendency to make the interveners arrogant and those subject to intervention, either angry or dependent – and often both. Intervention should not be the first policy option. It should be the last answer, not the first instinct.

 

The bad news is that intervention is expensive, tough and difficult to do.

The good news is that, if we can learn to do it better, we will get our fingers burnt less often – and in the process may make the world a much safer and less painful place than it is at present.

 

1710 words.

 

[1] Heidelberg University Centre for the study of Conflicts annual report quoted in Pravda 22 May 2006

Dmitry Medvedev and New Iron Curtain

“Do the Russians want war?” a Soviet-era song started. It went on o invite you to ask ordinary Russians – soldiers, workers, dock workers, fishermen, mothers, wives, sons of those who perished in the WW2 – whether they wanted war. The obvious answer was no.

Things may not be seem obvious today with a large number of Russians actually supporting the apparently warmongering mood of officials, as Russian tanks patrol Gori, and Sergey Ivanov describes the need for bombing in his perfect English accompanied by a wicked smile on BBC and CNN.

The unsophisticated Soviet-style propaganda heightened by hysteria on state-owned television broadcasts and billboards on the Moscow street that call for “Freedom of South Ossetia” and “you need it more than we do” statements with regard to WTO accession, might lead Europe and the US to believe that the Russians are their number three enemy and need to be punished for recent actions. Russian students with perfectly valid American visas are being turned away and sent back to Russia at US borders and there is talk of sanctions against Russians.

Is this the right strategy? Would sanctions against normal and civilised people help to resolve the conflict or even tone down official rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic ocean?

Although some would find it hard to believe, a significant proportion of the Russian people do not support anti-Georgian war, neither do they trust their leadership nor want to find themselves behind the freshly forged iron curtain. They believe in civilised values and are afraid of the new “Cold War” that many fear could result from the current conflict. While official sociological data may present overwhelming figures claiming all the Russians are as bloodthirsty as their leadership, the reality is more complex. Between large passive masses and an energised, but tiny opposition, there is a growing Russian middle class.

In May-June 2008 (two months before the war broke out,) the EU-Russia Centre undertook a study into the attitudes and feelings of well-off, educated urban citizens towards today’s Russia. We examined how the Russian middle classes perceive their country’s stability, security, rule of law and political process; we assessed their view of its place vis-a-vis Europe, its progress and problems; we posed certain behavioural choices in a variety of situations typical for Russia and its citizens; and, lastly, we considered their plans for the future.

While the study unveiled deep mistrust to the Western world with three quarters of respondents convinced that the West is likely to be hostile to a strong Russia, it also showed that less than half of Russia’s middle class believe in the much-vaunted stability of their country and of those over half see it as fragile, liable to change at any moment and under threat from a drop in oil prices or similar factors.

 

A central problem for the respondents is how to guarantee their own status, lifestyle, security of property and privacy. In many cases, this is so severe that many are considering leaving their homeland, or at the very least sending their children to be educated elsewhere. Half would consider moving abroad themselves – even if for a short period, (within the under 35 years group over 75% would consider emigrating). 63% want their children to gain experience an education abroad, while 35% would like to see their children live abroad permanently.

One cannot doubt that in the current situation, successful and well-educated middle class Russians are not feeling more stable or enthusiastic about their and their children’s future in Russia. It is not only them, but also international capital and managerial talent that is looking elsewhere, with RTS index at Moscow stock exchange falling following news first about Mechel, the war, and finally, Russia’s announcement of recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhasia independence.

These are all most recent examples of how over-reaction and the manipulation of Rule of Law has a tangible and damaging effect that will rob Russia of much-needed funding for its infrastructure as well as talent for its future development. It is important that the EU and the West speak with a single voice and insist that Russia must adhere to international law on Georgia. This is a matter, to of the rule of law. But we should remember that Georgia is not the only issue. There are other areas, too which offer a platform for discussions with Russia about the future shape of the relationship between the two blocs.

 

Does Mr. Medvedev want war? Hopefully not, as it will inevitably turn against his people and Russian future.

 

The Gas Crisis and the Opportunities for the EU

For anyone following Russia’s increasingly assertive handling of its neighbours and business partners, Gazprom’s decision to turn off gas supplies to Europe should not come as much of a surprise. After all, Russia’s mammoth gas monopoly is in perpetual conflict with transit countries for its commodities, and Ukraine has faced the same very threat in the past years. However the European Union seems to have been unprepared for what was a predictable sequel to an old conflict.

To succeed in resolving this conflict and prevent future similar crises, the EU should change its paradigm in its perception of what Russian outward-looking economic policies stand for. In recent years the majority of European pundits have been favourable to the increasing state control over Russian industry and finance, as well as other strategic changes in Russia’s economy initiated by the former president (now prime minister) Vladimir Putin. In the conflict between the Kremlin authorities and the old-style oligarchs who controlled vast financial and industrial empires in the 1990s, the former were considered to bringing predictability and stability to the hectic Russian economic life, as opposed to the chaos and wilderness of oligarchy. The excessive wildness of the transition itself, as what is now called “looting of Yukos” by the Kremlin’s inner circle, appeared to many to be the inevitable price for restoring the order.

Subsequent developments proved to be disappointing to those who had believed Russia to be a responsible state governed by the rule of law. The new Russian economic order is now widely seen as corporatist, corrupt, short on both effectiveness and efficiency, and full of cronyism.

However the true picture is more complicated. The new Russian elite of so called siloviky (former secret service, law enforcement and military officers) may appear to be focused on only seeking financial gain, but this impression is flawed. Yes, they are greedy, and in their desire to ship their wealth out of Russia as fast as possible, rather than invest it in the country seem to be conceding that the good times cannot last for long. But they also still retain a vision of their country as a dominant regional superpower, and they challenge the European values with what they call Russian distinctiveness. In the Kremlin’s world it is logical to utilise economic advantages as political leverage, which is now seen as a softer version of the military face-off of the ‘90s. The present Russian leaders have both an enthusiasm and a propensity to politicise every issue at their first touch.

What this means is that, in its dealings with Russia, the EU has to find a way to deal, not with the objective facts of a situation but with economic pressure used as apolitical instrument, whenever Moscow feels it has the potential to convert trade into political advantage. In case where “Gazprom stands for Russia” there cannot be just a trade price dispute. What seems to be commercial wrestling turns out to be a geopolitical Big Game. The difference in prices for gas supplies to pro-Western Ukraine and the more conformable Belarus epitomises this geopolitical approach.

Yet still there are sufficient opportunities to outplay the offender. With a unified production and transportation system, Gazprom technically cannot easily survive any extended blockade of Ukraine and the 17 European consumer states that stand behind it. Mentally the Kremlin’s inner circle is not ready to sacrifice its own money for the sake of ensuring Russia’s political grandeur.

For Europe the successful strategy may be to create its own political leverage against Moscow’s gas truncheon. It is a historical fact that Europe has never talked to Russia with one firm voice, and if it were to do so it could have a staggering effect. The EU has a new president who is ready for this task – Czech president Vaclav Klaus is a politician who can tell the politically inconvenient truth. The Czech tradition of pragmatism and imperturbable common sense could help design an effective energy policy without excessive hype, arrogance or anti-Russian malice. But Prague will need help from Europe’s larger players, too, who by now ought to realise that the policy of exchanging chumminess with Moscow in return for gas from Gazprom has backfired painfully . The time to unite around a policy designed to match Moscows realpolitik, with our own if we are to succeed in securing Europe’s energy needs for the future.

Rio Summit  New Statesman 

 

The pros and cons of foreign aid have been subject to endless debate and it is difficult to engage in this without becoming mired in cliché and turning it into a shouting match. Newspaper front pages scream about the UK aid budget, while committed humanitarians fire back and dig in.

 

It is right and proper to debate such an important issue, especially at a time of economic hardship; but before tackling the practicalities and politics of aid we should take a step back and look at exactly what we are committing to.

 

Many believe as I do that providing long-term development aid is the moral thing to do. But we should also recognise that it is, from a practical point of view, the right thing to do.

 

The Jubilee celebrations sparked a wave of national pride and properly so. But one of the reasons we are ‘Great’ Britain is because of the international moral leadership we have shown on foreign aid. You know the quality of a country by its ability to help the most disadvantaged, and the Government is entirely right in saying that we shouldn’t balance our books on the backs of the poorest in the world. Compassion is part of the quality of a nation and I am very proud of the current commitment to meet our aid targets at a time of economic hardship at home.

 

The moral argument is clear. But there is also enlightened self-interest here.

 

People think armies give leadership and that guns and bombs supply power. They recognise less that our aid policy also increases our international influence. On my last visit to the UN in New York, the Secretary General went out of his way to stress the number of times he used Britain’s example to encourage other countries to fulfil their promises on aid, as we have done. ‘You have set the agenda’, he said, ‘and this has given your country great influence’.

 

At a time when the world order is changing dramatically with the rise of China, India and Brazil, the soft power and influence that a strong moral position on aid gives Britain should not be underestimated.

 

Critics of development aid are right however to attack aid that creates dependency. As the President of UNICEF UK and a politician I know that foreign aid needs to be a hand-up not a hand-out. In the long-term it needs to help develop trade and economies and help give people the opportunity to stand on their own two feet.

 

I have recently returned from Liberia where I saw just this type of aid in action. A population of just 4 million still bears the scars of a country where a vicious war has raged. UNICEF funds a remarkable cash transfer scheme for child headed households, which has so far helped 2,000 children. The agency gives out $60,000 a month in total, which equates to $25 a month for the most vulnerable children.

 

In families benefiting from the scheme, 97% took their child to a health centre when they were ill, 90% had increased food security and children in participating families were 2/3 less likely to be involved in child labour than children in similarly poor households.

Undoubtedly of course, Aid can only work in the long-term with good governance. If I could do one thing to support this it would be to create a new agency called ‘Auditors sans frontiéres – have double-entry ledger will travel!’ In my time in Bosnia I saw how accountants can get at corruption and root it out, putting in place the framework for accountable, open government. Leaders like Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liberia need to be supported and the UK has a role in promoting good governance as part of its foreign aid programme.

 

But, development is working and aid has played a huge part in that. Globally, compared to 20 years ago 4 million less children will die this year, 3 million children have got the chance to go to school for the first time and 4 million more people have access to live saving drugs for HIV/AIDS.

 

Moreover, the right type of development aid does not only help countries grow and give children a better future but is also hugely important in helping to prevent great humanitarian crises. In the future, poverty and lack of access to resources will be one of the greatest drivers for conflict. Aid which lifts countries out of hopelessness and poverty is one of the best ways to prevent the conflicts of the future. If you think aid is expensive, just try war as an alternative. One of the things that has always puzzled me is why we are prepared to spend so much on fighting wars and yet so little on taking the steps that would have prevented them in the first place.

 

Last year is estimated to have been the most expensive year ever when it came to clearing up after disasters. Predictions show that the scale, frequency and severity of rapid onset humanitarian disasters will continue to grow in the coming years, and at an accelerating pace. And, as the Stern review noted, if climate change goes unchecked it could cause between an additional 60,000 and 250,000 child deaths in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa alone.

 

Helping children prepare and adapt for climate change needs to be a major focus so we can prevent floods, droughts and hurricanes damaging the lives of children in some of the world’s poorest countries.

 

The best way to cope with future disasters is to use aid to build resilience in the countries which are most vulnerable. Acting ahead of the catastrophe, rather than responding to it afterwards – being ahead of events, not always trailing along behind them with emergency relief.

 

Aid isn’t perfect but neither are governments or people. Our moral stand on foreign aid is the right one for vulnerable children, the global economy and for shaping the type of world we want to live in. But in a world which is growing increasingly turbulent, increasingly interconnected and increasingly violent, helping others to break out of the cycle of poverty disease and hopelessness, is not only morally right, it is also in our own enlightened self-interest.

 

1039 Words

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Paddy Ashdown

As the nature of global power changes, how do we secure our enduring interests?

History comes in two modes. In one of them, the gimbals on which power is mounted are steady, stable and unchanged. These are predictable times, times when we can look ahead with confidence and know what will happen. They are not necessarily peaceful times but they are at least unbewildering times.

Then there is the second mode – the times of change, when power shifts. These are turbulent times, puzzling times and, all too often, bloody times. We are living in the second mode. All is changing, although you would not think so to look at our foreign policy or our defence policy, for they are anchored firmly in the past and pay no attention to the new world now emerging.

Power is shifting from the nations and institutions we are used to holding it, to those we are not – and it is doing so in two significant ways.

First, we are experiencing a vertical power shift. Power is now migrating out of the institutions of the nation state, onto the global stage. This is because today’s world is interdependent in a way it never has been before. When there is swine flu in Mexico, it is a problem for Aberdeen in the next few hours. When Lehman Brothers collapses, the global economy suffers. Fires in the Russian steppes cause food riots in Africa. The irresponsible burning of fossil fuels in the West drowns Bangladesh. We are deeply interconnected and it is that interconnection that matters. We used to pretend that there were issues which were domestic and others which were foreign policy. There is now no domestic issue that does not have a foreign policy quotient to it.

On this global stage, the institutions of democratic accountability are non-existent and the institutions of legality are very weak. The modern powers that are growing have no reference to the frontiers of nation states. They may be things which we like, such as the internet; free trade; global media and global finance but we must acknowledge and wary of the lack of accountability in each of these areas. Of course we also see things we do not like, such as ISIS, international terrorism and global pandemics. What these phenomena have in common is that they each represent a new arena, impossible to control through national law.

Historically the powerful have been relaxed about the existence of lawless spaces. Indeed, they have often benefited because they can exert their power to define the rules themselves. We as a nation have experience with this. However, sooner or later, unwatched lawless space is occupied by destroyers. With the degradation of the power of national law brought about by globalisation, this is exactly what has happened.

From this history of the nation state in the 20^th century, we can see that where power goes, governance must follow. In what looks to me like a deeply turbulent age, our capacity to create greater stability rather than greater turbulence will depend on our ability to bring governance to the global stage. We need to abandon isolationism and realise it is entirely in the interests of a medium-sized country which needs stability and security, such as the United Kingdom, to strengthen governance around the world.

For stability to be achieved, we will have to act. It will not be sufficient to stand on the side-lines and have a proliferation of further multilateral UN institutions. The world needs the UN as an international forum; as the developer of international law; as the legitimiser of actions—but when it comes to taking difficult action in non-permissive circumstances, my belief is that coalitions of the willing will have greater practical effect.

I know this from my own experience. As High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, charged by the international community with maintaining stability after the conflict in that region, I reported twice a year to the UN Security Council for the conduct of my mandate. But my managing board was the Peace Implementation Council—a body made up of those who had committed troops and resources to peace in Bosnia.

Governance on the global stage is most likely to be created through the growth of new, treaty-based, institutions. These institutions will, by necessity not be multilateral as the UN is but they will be more effective. We have seen some already emerging: the WTO is one; the International Court of Justice is a second; and the G20, is not quite a treaty but it has quasi-treaty powers, is a third. Kyoto is a fourth.

As a medium-sized nation, it is in our interests to play our part in the creation of these institutions. Yet this idea of a rule-based world order features nowhere in the Government’s foreign policies. British civil servants and diplomats were the people who created the United Nations; we have an immense role to play and the ability to make an immense contribution here. But our response is instead to cut the budget of the Foreign Office

The second great power shift, is, of course, is that from west to east. We have come to accept this in terms of the new economic power of the Pacific basin. What we may not realise is that these will transit into political power and military power in due time.

We are moving from 50 years of a monopolar world dominated by the United States to a multipolar world in which the role of our foreign policy and our defence will be wholly different. If you want a model of what comes next, do not look to the last century as we often so myopically do; look rather at the Europe of the 19th century. Europe then, with its many viable powers is a far better model of today’s situation that then bi-polar arrangements of the cold war. In those times Britain’s role was not fixed; we always played to the balance. This was a period of much more subtle foreign policy. Lord Palmerston, twice prime minister in the 1800’s once said: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow”. Contrast that with our present policy in which we cleave to the old, simple, certainty that we need to do no more than cling to the United States.

Now, if we want to operate in the world, we have to move beyond the Atlantic club; we have to bring in other partners, including for instance the Chinese. Of course, we do not share their values but in many cases we do share their interests. Think of the 3,700 Chinese serving under the blue flag and the blue helmet of the UN. Think of the problems of the Somali pirates off the horn of Africa, where the Chinese provide the largest naval unit that is today fighting the pirates. Why? Certainly not out of charity. They want to keep the sea lanes open, just as we did in the days of our mercantile power. What we must recognise this is in our interest as well, whether we share values or not. These are the kind of relationships we should begin to develop.

In the modern age, the most important part of what you can do, is what you can do with others. The most important thing about our structures, whether nations or any other organisation, are not their vertical capacities but are rather the interconnectors, the docking points, that help us to build the wider coalitions that create the networks that produce effective outcomes.

We will, of course, rely on the Atlantic alliance and Europe as our primary alliances, but we will have to build alternatives and new coalitions beyond that. Where we do that is where we will succeed, and where we do not do it is where we will fail.

We must shed some of our recent geo-political instincts. We see a problem in the world and our first response is to bomb it. We believe we live in a kinetic age, but we do not. We live in the new age of diplomacy, in which our capacity to build wider coalitions to achieve the interests of our nation, not necessarily coalitions of values but coalitions of interest, will define success or failure.

Paddy Ashdown is xxxxxxxxx

 

 

New Statesman article

We are on the edge of one of those periods in history when the pattern of world power changes; when the established order shifts, and a new order begins to emerge. These are almost always difficult times for the weak, tough for those whose power is waning, and usually bloody for almost everyone.

This economic recession is not like any other we have recently experienced. We will not plummet down and bounce back comfortably to where we were before. This is about something deeper. The tectonic plates of global power are shifting, and when it is over we in the West will, relatively speaking, be weaker and those in the East will be stronger.

The last time we saw a shift of power on this scale was when leadership of the world passed from the old powers of Europe to the emerging power of the United States. And we all remember the convulsions which followed that collapse of empires and the emergence of a new order.

Some propose China’s ascent will follow a straight line, but I do not believe that. China’s ascent to great power status – and great power is her most likely destination – will not be smooth. Their economy may be largely liberalised, but unlike India, their society is not. My guess is as they begin to lose their old communist structures in favour of a freer society, there will be considerable turbulence. Chinese history is littered with instances when the nation, as disparate and ethnically diverse as Europe, stood at the edge of greatness and then descended into dissolution and chaos.

Nor do I agree with friends who tell me, often with ill disguised glee, that the United States has passed the zenith of its glory. The symptoms of decline in nations are scleroticism, institutional arthritis and resistance to change. And the United States shows none of these – as the still remarkable election of Barack Obama clearly shows.

But though the United State’s position as the world’s pre-eminent power is unlikely to change soon, the context in which she holds that position is certain to. We are no longer looking at a world dominated by a single superpower. The growth of new power centres means the emergence of a multi-polar world; one which will look more like the nineteenth century balance that great British Foreign Secretary George Canning used to call “The Concert of Europe”.

This will have a number of important consequences.

The Atlantic relationship will remain key on the both European and American side. But it will not serve as a lynchpin for all other policies, as it has over the last half century. The United States will have interests which do not always coincide with those of Europe, and vice versa. For Europe, this will mean a more subtle and sophisticated foreign policy, not simply hanging onto the apron strings of our friendly neighbourhood superpower. And for both, it means developing a more mature relationship, in which we can disagree without shouting betrayal.

Arguably the important consequence of this new shape will be this: we are reaching the beginning of the end of six centuries of the domination of Western power, Western institutions and Western values over world affairs. We are already discovering that, if we want to get things done – redesigning the world economic order, intervening for peace – we can no longer do them within the cosy Atlantic club. We will have to find new allies in places we would never previously have looked.

Power is not just shifting laterally from West to East; it is shifting vertically, too. It is migrating out of the structure of nation states and into the global space, where the instruments of regulation are few and the framework of law is weak.

Look at the institutions having difficulties at the moment – national governments, political structures, the old establishments. Note that nearly all depend on the nation state; their range of action confined within borders. Now look at those institutions growing in power and reach: the internet; the satellite broadcasters; the trans-national corporations; the international money changers and speculators; international crime and terrorism. Note that all operate oblivious of national borders and largely beyond the reach of national regulation and the law.

Not only power but problems, too, have been globalised. The uncomfortable truth – which Westminster refuse to acknowledge, and our old institutions find no way to cope with – is that almost no problem can be solved within the nation state or by its institutions alone. Not our ability to protect ourselves; not the cleanliness of our environment; not our health; not our jobs; not our mortgages. These and more now depend not on the actions of our governments, but on their ability to work with others in a set of institutions which are global in scope and international in character – of which history may say the EU was the first, albeit highly imperfect example.

Another factor is shaping our age in a way different in scale from anything before, and this is our increasing global interdependence.

Of course, what happens in one nation has always been of interest to its neighbours and allies – that’s why one of the oldest government functions is diplomacy. But today’s interdependence is of a completely different order. Nations today are not just linked by trade, commerce and diplomacy, they are intimately interlocked in almost every aspect of daily life.

What happens in one can have a profound, direct and immediate consequence on another. An outbreak of swine flu, the collapse of Lehman brothers, the revelations of 9/11 – these can set in train a domino effect across the entire globe in a matter of moment.

Everything is connected to everything, and this interconnectedness applies not just to external relations; it applies to internal organisation, too. But the problem is that our governments are not structured to do things in an interlocking way. They are made up of vertical stove pipes, steeped in a stove piped culture and are run, in the main, by people with stove piped minds.

Our present government took its form – as did every advanced Western democracy – in the nineteenth century. It followed the fashionable structures of the Industrial Revolution and the era of mass production: strong command chains; vertical hierarchies; specialisation of tasks. This was right and appropriate, for it suited the age.

But it does not suit our age. For this is the age of post industrial structures, of flat hierarchies; of networks dedicated to bringing disparate inputs together at a single focal point.

Government structure and culture remain resolutely stuck in the past. Ministers and Senior Civil Servants are judged on how well they hold the territorial integrity of their department, preserve its budget and defend its payroll. Networking with other departments is regarded as a threat, not an opportunity. The screaming of gears heard in Whitehall is the sound of institutions knowing that they ought to network, but finding it impossible to do so.

Time now to unveil my third law for the modern age: The most important part of what you can do, is what you can do with others.

It is an institutions’ ability not to do, but to network, which matters most. If you want to see the price of failing to understand that, you need look no further than Afghanistan. The chief reason for failure lies not in the ineffectiveness of the Afghan government, who we love to blame, but in our failure to have a co-ordinated international plan: our inability to work between nations, our determination to look solely through the prism of national, rather than international action and our refusal to speak and act with a single purpose. The real scandal of Afghanistan was that our soldiers paid with their lives because our politicians could not or would not get their act together.

It does not matter if you are an army unit, or an NGO, or an aid deliverer like DfID, or a Ministry like the Foreign Office – the most important part of what you can do is not what you can do by yourself, but what you can do with others.

And because everything is connected to everything, another revelation of our age is this: we increasingly share a destiny with our enemy. This concept is not new of course, for it has always been the proposition of poets and saints and visionaries that we should learn to live together. The great John Donne poem No man is an island says it all: “every man’s death affecteth me, for I am involved in mankind. Send not to ask for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee”.

[William E.] Gladstone said it too in 1879, when Lord Roberts invaded Afghanistan, in his second Midlothian campaign:

“Do not forget that the sanctity of life in the hill villages of Afghanistan amongst the winter snows, is no less inviolate in the eye of Almighty God as can be your own. Do not forget that he who made you brothers in the same flesh and blood, bound you by the laws of mutual love. And that love is not limited to the shores of this island, but it crosses the whole surface of the earth, encompassing the greatest along with the meanest in its unmeasured scope”

But here is the difference between their age and ours. For Donne and for Gladstone, these were recommendations of morality. For us they are part of the equation for our success and maybe even our survival.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Piece for the New Statesman – Lord Paddy Ashdown, UNICEF UK President

 

 

The pros and cons of foreign aid have been subject to endless debate and it is difficult to engage in this without becoming mired in cliché and turning it into a shouting match. Newspaper front pages scream about the UK aid budget, while committed humanitarians fire back and dig in.

 

It is right and proper to to debate such an important issue, especially at a time of economic hardship; but before tackling the practicalities and politics of aid we should take a step back and look at exactly what we are committing to.

 

Many believe as I do that providing long-term development aid is the moral thing to do. But we should also recognise that it, from a practical point of view the right thing to do.

 

The jubilee celebrations sparked a wave of national pride and properly so. But one of the reasons we are ‘Great’ Britain is because of the international moral leadership we have shown on foreign aid. You know the quality of a country by its ability to help the most disadvantaged, and the Government is entirely right in saying that we shouldn’t balance our books on the backs of the poorest in the world. Compassion is part of the quality of a nation and I am very proud of the current commitment to meet our aid targets at a time of economic hardship at home.

 

The moral argument is, therefore, clear. But there is also enlightened self-interest here.

 

People think armies give leadership and that guns and bombs supply power. They recognise less that our aid policy also increases our international influence. On my last visit to the UN in New York, the Secretary General went out of his way to stress the number of times used Britain’s example to encourage other countries to fulfil their promises on aid, as we have done.. ‘You have set the agenda’, he said, ‘and this has given your country great influence’.

 

At a time when the world order is changing dramatically with the rise of China, India and Brazil, the soft power and influence that a strong moral position on aid gives Britain should not be underestimated.

 

The debate then always seems to rage about whether aid achieves anything and whether it creates dependency.

 

Critics of development aid are right to attack aid that creates dependency. As the President of UNICEF UK and a politician I know that foreign aid needs to be a hand-up not a hand-out. In the long-term it needs to help develop trade and economies and help give people the opportunity to stand on their own two feet.

 

I have recently returned from Liberia where I saw just this type of aid in action.

 

Liberia, with a population of just 4 million people still bears the scars of a country where a vicious war has raged.

 

UNICEF funds a cash transfer scheme in Liberia for child headed households. These are children who have lost their parents and grandparents and are left to fend for themselves. The scheme has so far helped 2,000 children and proved a lifesaver. UNICEF gives out $60,000 a month in total, which equates to $25 a month for the most vulnerable children. It has already seen remarkable results.

 

One young woman Haula, who was responsible for her three younger siblings, started on the cash transfer scheme when she was 19 years old. Haula was left some land by her grandmother to farm, and thanks to the cash transfer scheme, her brothers and sisters can also now go to school meaning they have a much better chance at life.

 

Sceptics might say that giving money to vulnerable people won’t make a difference because they’ll spend it badly. However, of those families benefitting from the cash transfer scheme, 97% took their child to a health centre when they were ill, 90% had increased food security and there was a 2/3 drop in child labour (exact figures to be verified). UNICEF is committed to paying for the cash transfer programme for three years when they hope the Government will roll it out across the country.

 

The legacy of the civil war is still everywhere in Liberia.  Basic water and sanitation projects, such as digging wells are essential especially as the country is still struggling to cope with an estimated figure of refugees living on the border with the Ivory Coast. 60% (actual number needed) of these are children and still need humanitarian assistance to make sure they can eat, have clean water and go to school. We need to prioritise those in the most need but make sure that the result of this help is progress not stagnation.

 

Aid cannot make a difference by itself and can only work in the long-term with good governance. A recent report by the Overseas Development Institute showed that good governance has been crucial to development and that aid has been most successful when supporting this. If I could do one thing to support this it would be to create a new agency called ‘Auditors san frontiers’ – have double-entry ledger will travel!’ In my time in Bosnia I saw how accountants can get at corruption and root it out, putting in place the framework for accountable, open government. Leaders like Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liberia need to be supported and the UK has a role in promoting good governance as part of its foreign aid programme.

 

Mozambique is another example – the poorest country in the world just 20 years ago – has increased its spending on health care by over half, and in the past decade the number of children who die before their fifth birthday has been reduced by almost 20 per cent.  Globally, compared to 20 years ago 4 million less children will die this year, 3 million children have got the chance to go to school for the first time and 4 million more people have access to live saving drugs for HIV/AIDS.

 

Moreover, the right type of development aid does not only help countries grow and give children a better future but is also hugely important in helping to prevent great humanitarian crises. In the future, poverty and lack of access to resources will be one of the greatest drivers for conflict. Aid which lifts countries out of hopelessness and poverty is one of the best ways to prevent the conflicts of the future. If you think aid is expensive, just try war as an alternative. One of the things that has always puzzled me is why we are preparded to spend so much on fighting wars and yet so little on taking the steps that would have prevented them in the first place.

 

Last year is estimated to have been the most expensive year ever when it came to clearing up after disasters. Predictions show that the scale, frequency and severity of rapid onset humanitarian disasters will continue to grow in the coming years, and at an accelerating pace. Climate related disasters could affect 375 million people every year by 2015, up from 263 million in 2010. The poorest children are always the most vulnerable in any disaster. As the Stern review noted, if climate change goes unchecked it could cause between an additional 60,000 and 250,000 child deaths in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa alone.

 

Helping children prepare and adapt for climate change needs to be a major focus so we can prevent floods, droughts and hurricanes damaging the lives of children in some of the world’s poorest countries. The best way to cope with future disasters is to use aid to build resilience in the countries which are most vulnerable. Acting ahead of the catastrophe, rather than responding to it afterwards. Being ahead of events, not alwys trailing along behind them with emergency relief.

 

Aid isn’t perfect but neither are governments or people. Our moral stand on foreign aid is the right one for vulnerable children, the global economy and for shaping the type of world we want to live in. But in a world which is growing increasingly turbulent, increasingly interconnected and increasingly violent, helping others to break out of the cycle of poverty disease and hopelessness, is not only morally right, it is also in our own enlightened self-interest.